



CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONALISM:  TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 
AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
Stephen M. Griffin* 
For anyone who regards U.S. constitutionalism as synonymous 
with the federal Constitution, the kind of constitutionalism practiced 
in California can be disorienting.  In California and other states, a 
constitutional and legislative process driven by popular vote runs par-
allel to the familiar three branches of government.  In this Article, I 
provide a new perspective on the origins and persistence of “Califor-
nia constitutionalism,” a kind of constitutional order in which the 
mechanisms of direct democracy—the initiative, referendum, and re-
call—are employed to supplement representative democratic institu-
tions.1  In California, the initiative and referendum are not merely ex-
tra avenues to put legislation on the books.  They are crucially 
important constitutional processes.  Through these processes, Califor-
nia voters have repeatedly reshaped their constitutional order and af-
fected the national political agenda.2 
In contemporary times, direct democracy has been consistently 
controversial since California voters adopted tax-cutting Proposition 
13 in 1978.3  The last round of public debate occurred relatively re-
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 1 For recent studies of direct democracy, especially the initiative, see JOHN M. ALLSWANG, 
THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA, 1898–1998 (2000); SHAUN BOWLER & 
TODD DONOVAN, DEMANDING CHOICES:  OPINION, VOTING, AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
(1998); CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS:  DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES (Shaun 
Bowler et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS]; ELISABETH R. GERBER, 
THE POPULIST PARADOX:  INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE OF DIRECT 
LEGISLATION (1999); JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW:  THE INITIATIVE, 
PUBLIC POLICY, AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2004); Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1096 (2005); Elizabeth Garrett & Mathew D. McCubbins, The Dual 
Path Initiative Framework, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 299 (2007). 
 2 See, e.g., DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED:  INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER 
OF MONEY 51–52 (2000) (highlighting the national influence of Proposition 13). 
 3 See THOMAS GOEBEL, A GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE:  DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, 
1890–1940, at 189 (2002) (“The pivotal event that demonstrated the potential of the ini-
tiative was the property tax revolt in California that culminated in the successful passage 
of Proposition 13 in 1978.”). 
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cently, with critics such as David Broder and Peter Schrag decrying 
what they saw as its adverse consequences for governance.4  Whatever 
the benefits and failings of direct democracy, I suggest insufficient at-
tention has been paid to the historical and institutional question of 
how we got here in the first place.  Sometimes overly hasty criticisms 
of direct democracy have substituted for a more nuanced analysis of 
the reality that the United States has multiple constitutional orders or 
regimes, originating from different periods in its history, operating 
within its borders. 
Coming to terms with the origins of direct democracy depends on 
understanding constitutional orders as time-bound and contingent.  I 
will argue that direct democracy grew out of the failure of the Fram-
ers’ eighteenth-century political institutions in the context of late 
nineteenth-century politics.  Direct democracy is thus less a deviation 
from the Framers’ design than a creative supplement forced by fun-
damentally new circumstances. 
My main thesis is that the origins and persistence of direct democ-
racy has to do with the problem of trust in government.5  Focusing on 
the problem of trust establishes a new context for understanding di-
rect democracy.  Put simply, citizens are more likely to favor direct 
democracy when they distrust politicians and how the government 
works (or appears to work).  In such circumstances, the legitimacy of 
representative government comes into question and the alternative of 
direct democracy appears reasonable.  Once direct democracy is 
adopted, it is unlikely a purely representative system can be restored 
without confronting the problem of trust. 
In general, trust in government (or rather, the prevalence of dis-
trust) should be regarded as an important constitutional issue.  The 
frequent resort to direct democracy in California and other states 
should prompt us to rethink whether the system of representative 
government established by the Founding Generation is adequate to 
the challenges posed by contemporary politics.  Direct democracy is 
in many respects the paradoxical consequence of the corrosive dis-
trust produced by what scholars might regard as the ordinary and le-
gitimate processes of representative government.  Coming to terms 
 
 4 See, e.g., BRODER, supra note 2, at 51–52 (decrying the “stunted . . . growth” and “adminis-
trative nightmare” created by Proposition 13 and the subsequent growth industry devoted 
to “manipulation of public opinion”); PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST:  CALIFORNIA’S 
EXPERIENCE, AMERICA’S FUTURE (1998) (depicting California as a state suffering under 
the burden of previous ballot initiatives). 
 5 The connection between distrust of government and direct democracy has been noted by 
its critics.  See BRODER, supra note 2, at 1–3. 
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with direct democracy means appreciating that its flaws, while quite 
real and substantial, cannot be addressed without acknowledging the 
serious problems citizens perceive with representative institutions.  It 
is likely that both require fundamental reform. 
Why focus on California constitutionalism?  California is, of course, 
an important state6 with a distinctive and interesting history that in-
cludes frequent recourse to the processes of direct democracy.  In 
addition, California’s challenges, such as funding government and 
coping with racial, ethnic, linguistic, and ideological diversity, tend to 
be national challenges.7  The increased use of direct democracy by 
the California electorate, especially the initiative, has drawn the at-
tention of scholars, as well as severe criticism from well-informed po-
litical observers.8  But my reasons for focusing on California go be-
yond these points.  California is worth considering as a “new-
modeled” polity of the late nineteenth century.  California’s present 
constitution was adopted in 1879 and underwent a significant reor-
dering in the progressive period.  As perhaps the best known and 
most studied example of progressive era constitutionalism, Califor-
nia’s experience can be usefully compared with the U.S. Constitution 
and the constitutional experience of the Founding Generation. 
California is such a large and extensive polity9 that we can glimpse 
in it what the U.S. constitutional order might have looked like had it 
been created through a constitutional convention early in the twenti-
eth century.  In some significant ways, California’s constitution tracks 
the structure of the contemporary constitutional order far more 
closely than does the U.S. Constitution.  Most important, the problem 
of trust in government is a national problem, one not unique to Cali-
fornia.  Studying California’s history can illuminate this ongoing con-
cern with American government. 
 
 6 As of the 2000 census, California was the most populous state, having 12.5% of the popu-
lation of the United States.  It had the fifth largest economy in the world in 2005.  KEVIN 
STARR, CALIFORNIA:  A HISTORY, at ix (2005). 
 7 See MARK BALDASSARE, CALIFORNIA IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM:  THE CHANGING SOCIAL AND 
POLITICAL LANDSCAPE 17 (2000) (describing California as “a political microcosm for the 
nation”). 
 8 See BRODER, supra note 2; SCHRAG, supra note 4 (blaming ballot initiatives in large part for 
California’s budgetary woes); see also RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS:  THE 
INITIATIVE PROCESS IN AMERICA (2002) (encouraging greater skepticism of ballot initia-
tives). 
 9 As California journalist Peter Schrag remarked, “We are not Kansas or Iowa or even Flor-
ida.  We are a nation state.”  Peter Schrag, Historian Kevin Starr’s Grand California Pano-
rama, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 15, 2004, at B7. 
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This Article has three parts.  In Part I, I review the history of the 
origins of direct democracy in California.  While the story behind the 
adoption of the initiative, referendum, and recall is somewhat famil-
iar, important institutional and constitutional questions have often 
gone unaddressed.  In Part II, I first review the contemporary status 
of direct democracy in California in relation to the problem of trust 
in government.  I then present a detailed explanation of the decline 
of trust in government in the United States by reviewing the most 
relevant social science evidence.  I argue that the problem of trust in 
government is a national problem extending back to the 1960s.  This 
suggests that the use of direct democracy will persist until the prob-
lems citizens have with representative institutions are acknowledged 
and addressed.  Finally, in Part III, I offer some concluding reflec-
tions. 
I.  ESTABLISHING DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN CALIFORNIA 
Direct democracy has been part of American government for over 
a century.10  Despite this long history, it remains the subject of a con-
tentious debate.11  Indeed, critics often treat it as a newcomer to our 
constitutional system and tend to concentrate on the question of 
whether we should be for or against direct democracy.12  However, I 
believe that before we can evaluate any aspect of the American consti-
tutional order, we should have a secure understanding as to why it ex-
ists and what purpose it serves. 
It is thus appropriate to begin with the original reasons direct 
democracy was adopted in the early twentieth century.  Its adoption 
can be viewed as something of a puzzle.  The conventional wisdom of 
constitutional scholars is that the system of representative govern-
ment adopted by the Founding Generation has stood the test of time.  
If there is a policy that a clear majority of the public favors, their rep-
resentatives have substantial incentives to give the people what they 
want.  In doing so, they will earn the public’s favor and probably be 
reelected.  If this system works to generally implement public opin-
ion, the puzzle is why direct democracy exists at all.  If, as many be-
lieve, the Framers of the Constitution designed a stable and well-
 
 10 The main wave of state adoptions of the initiative came between 1902 and 1918.  JOHN J. 
DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 94 (2006). 
 11 ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 4. 
 12 See, e.g., BRODER, supra note 2, at 1 (“The initiative process, an import now just over one 
hundred years old, threatens to challenge or even subvert the American system of gov-
ernment in the next few decades.”). 
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ordered representative government,13 how did direct democracy 
come about? 
To answer this question, we should briefly consider the standard 
story of how direct democracy was adopted in California.14  After the 
“Big Four” of Leland Stanford, Collis P. Huntington, Charles 
Crocker, and Mark Hopkins15 created the Central Pacific and built 
the transcontinental railroad, its successor, the Southern Pacific, 
achieved a monopoly over rail transportation in California16 and came 
to dominate its politics.  The railroad sought to control the political 
system in much the same way as it sought to dominate the state’s 
transportation network.  It corrupted politicians, political parties, in-
deed the entire political system.17  Certain public-spirited citizens who 
did not owe their livelihood to the railroad eventually reacted against 
this corruption and sponsored the Lincoln-Roosevelt League, the po-
litical arm of the progressive movement in California.18  They con-
tested for power and won control of state government.  Led by Gov-
ernor Hiram Johnson, they enacted various reforms, including the 
initiative, referendum, and recall in 1911.19 
The standard story about the origins of direct democracy suggests 
strongly that the citizens of California had lost confidence in the 
normal workings of representative democracy.  Accounts of the ori-
gins of direct democracy often say that its advocates believed their po-
litical system was corrupt.20  Were they right?  If they were, how did 
this occur and what does it tell us about the system of government 
bequeathed to California by our constitutional tradition? 
 
 13 See, e.g., Mathew D. McCubbins, Putting the State Back into State Government:  The Constitution 
and the Budget, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA:  MAKING STATE GOVERNMENT 
MORE EFFECTIVE AND RESPONSIVE 353, 354 (Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll eds., 1995) 
[hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA] (blaming reform initiatives start-
ing in the Progressive Era for limiting the effectiveness of California’s government). 
 14 For a useful account, see Karl Manheim & Edward P. Howard, A Structural Theory of the 
Initiative Power in California, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1165, 1174–90 (1998).  See also Nathaniel 
A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy:  Why the Initiative, Referendum and Recall 
Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL’Y REV. 11 (1997) (providing further ex-
planations of the origin of ballot initiatives in Western states). 
 15 On the “Big Four,” see JAMES J. RAWLS & WALTON BEAN, CALIFORNIA:  AN INTERPRETIVE 
HISTORY 171–73 (2003). 
 16 Id. at 180–84. 
 17 See id. at 231–40. 
 18 Id. at 260–64. 
 19 SCHRAG, supra note 4, at 189–90. 
 20 E.g., ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 5; BRODER, supra note 2, at 26. 
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In previous work, I have argued that towards the end of the nine-
teenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century the 
United States confronted the need to expand and modernize the na-
tional administrative state.21  In the early stages of this adjustment, 
there was a fundamental mismatch between the rudimentary and 
nonprogrammatic institutions of government at the federal level and 
the rapidly developing industrial economy, the growth of large-scale 
business organizations, and an increasingly urbanized and ethnically 
pluralistic society.22  This mismatch strongly influenced the subse-
quent development of the national state and derived from two gaps 
between constitutional powers and institutional means.  Specifically, 
the Constitution had created a relatively weak national state with un-
certain powers of enforcement and a limited administrative capacity. 
Increasingly, Congress had to deal with complex, ongoing regula-
tory issues that could not be solved through the distribution of bene-
fits.23  However, Congress found itself unable to resolve these issues 
through the legislative process.  Political parties and elections could 
not help because they were not oriented toward national policymak-
ing.  There was thus a gap between the public authority the electoral 
process provided and the kind of public authority the elected 
branches needed to deal with these new issues.  Consequently, there 
was a move away from vesting public authority in the “democratic 
party-legislative process.”24 
The establishment of direct democracy in California is a good ex-
ample of the consequences of the mismatch at the state level between 
governing institutions and a rapidly modernizing economy.  In state 
constitutions adopted in 1849 and extensively revised in 1879, Cali-
fornians followed the model of the U.S. Constitution and created a 
constitutional order with multiple and competing power centers.25  
However, this pluralistic constitutional arrangement was not sup-
ported by a plurality of power centers in the economy and society.  In 
 
 21 STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM:  FROM THEORY TO POLITICS 79–80 
(1996) (citing STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE:  THE EXPANSION 
OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920, at 10–18 (1982)). 
 22 See generally ALAN DAWLEY, STRUGGLES FOR JUSTICE:  SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE 
LIBERAL STATE (1991) (approaching historical conflicts and consensus through an ex-
amination of contradictions in social order, structure, and governance). 
 23 GRIFFIN, supra note 21, at 79 (“The mismatch between private power and public authority 
led to a kind of breakdown in the constitutional order.”). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. III–VI (establishing a government with three separate, co-
equal branches).  The current constitution, adopted in 1879, maintains the same general 
structure.  See generally CAL. CONST. (maintaining the same structure). 
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the nineteenth century, California had only a few power centers, with 
the Southern Pacific overwhelmingly dominant.26  The Southern Pa-
cific sought predictability from the political system in order to recoup 
its enormous investment in the railroad.  It also sought political sup-
port for its effort to expand and indeed monopolize California’s 
transportation network.27  California thus entered the Union precipi-
tously and without the political maturity that characterized the 
American colonies in 1776.  This observation may strike some as odd, 
but historians will remind us that the colonies had experienced well 
over a century of continuous social, economic, political, and legal de-
velopment on the eve of the Revolutionary War.28 
California sought admission into the Union only one year after 
the Gold Rush began and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo was 
signed, ending the war with Mexico.29  Gold had been discovered at 
Sutter’s Mill just nine days earlier, but the signers were unaware of 
this event.30  The Treaty was ratified in May 1848 and news reached 
California in August.31  Military government continued out of neces-
sity, as Congress could not agree on a territorial government.32  As a 
consequence, California would skip the territorial stage of govern-
ment entirely.33 
Prior to the Gold Rush, California’s non-Indian population was 
less than 15,000.34  The sudden massive influx caused by gold fever re-
sulted in a population of 223,856 in 1852.  For 1860 the regular cen-
sus figure was 380,000, and for 1870 more than 560,000, almost all of 
them men.35  These new immigrants did not come to California with 
the idea of living there permanently.  As stated by historians Rawls 
and Bean: 
 
 26 GEORGE E. MOWRY, THE CALIFORNIA PROGRESSIVES 9–22 (1951); SPENCER C. OLIN, JR., 
CALIFORNIA’S PRODIGAL SONS:  HIRAM JOHNSON AND THE PROGRESSIVES, 1911–1917, at 1–3 
(1968); KEVIN STARR, INVENTING THE DREAM:  CALIFORNIA THROUGH THE PROGRESSIVE 
ERA 199–207 (1985). 
 27 See WILLIAM DEVERELL, RAILROAD CROSSING:  CALIFORNIANS AND THE RAILROAD, 1850–
1910, at 27–29 (1994) (detailing the expansionary goals of the “Big Four” railroad com-
panies). 
 28 For a historical overview, see generally AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER:  
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds., 1978). 
 29 RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 15, at 95. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 117. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 117–18. 
 34 Id. at 111. 
 35 Id. 
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The great majority of them came in the hope that they could quickly 
plunder California of its treasure and return to their homes. . . . Most of 
those who remained in California did so because they failed to accumu-
late even enough to get them back home.  On the whole they were un-
successful, disillusioned, embittered men.36 
As historian John Burns remarks, “most gold seekers did not view 
California as a permanent destination and had little interest in civic 
affairs.”37 
California’s first constitutional convention occurred in September 
1849.  Most of the new constitution was not original, as the delegates 
followed the examples of Iowa and New York.38  The deliberations of 
the convention showed how difficult it was to maintain the distinction 
between fundamental principles, which properly belong in a constitu-
tion, and legislative matters.39  California was then admitted into the 
Union as part of the Compromise of 1850, in which it was recognized 
as a free state, but the territories of Utah and New Mexico could be 
organized without any ban against slavery.40 
What sort of “state” was it?  As Burns states, “It was a lightly occu-
pied, vast area that gained worldwide attention with unprecedented 
speed. . . . Public and governmental operations were virtually non-
existent.”41  The state’s political authorities, such as they were, strug-
gled to provide a legal order for a small and transitory population.42  
Nineteenth-century American government has been described as a 
state of “courts and parties,”43 but in California, even these institu-
tions did not exist at this early stage. 
One of the most important legacies of the Constitution of 1849 
that is relevant to the establishment of direct democracy was its limi-
tation on the number of representatives in both houses of the state 
legislature.  As modified by the 1879 Constitution, the California As-
sembly may have no more than eighty members and the California 
 
 36 Id. at 112. 
 37 John F. Burns, Taming the Elephant:  An Introduction to California’s Statehood and Constitu-
tional Era, in TAMING THE ELEPHANT:  POLITICS, GOVERNMENT, AND LAW IN PIONEER 
CALIFORNIA 1, 5 (John F. Burns & Richard J. Orsi eds., 2003) [hereinafter TAMING THE 
ELEPHANT]. 
 38 See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 15, at 121. 
 39 See Gordon Morris Bakken, The Courts, the Legal Profession, and the Development of Law in 
Early California, in TAMING THE ELEPHANT, supra note 37, at 74, 77 (relating various state-
ments by the delegates concerning both immediate and abstract concerns associated with 
the formation of a government). 
 40 RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 15, at 122–23. 
 41 Burns, supra note 37, at 4. 
 42 Id. at 4–6. 
 43 SKOWRONEK, supra note 21, at 24. 
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Senate no more than forty.44  The consequence today is that the most 
populous state has enormously large legislative districts, in all likeli-
hood making it more difficult for members of the legislature to rep-
resent their constituents effectively.  As Peter Schrag noted in 1998, 
“California’s senate districts, each with a population of some 800,000 
residents, are larger than its fifty-two congressional districts, making it 
unlikely that many voters will have any direct contact with their repre-
sentatives.”45 
Focusing on the adequacy of the system of representation is im-
portant, because it is precisely this aspect of the California constitu-
tional order that was targeted as inadequate by the advocates of direct 
democracy.  Californians had acquired a poor opinion of their state 
legislature by the 1870s.46  As Judson Grenier notes, “‘[c]onflict of in-
terest’ was not a commonplace concept”47 in the legislature.  He con-
tinues, “That first political factions and then special business interests 
compromised the integrity of the state legislature was recognized by 
most nineteenth-century historians and contributed to the public dis-
affection that led to the second constitutional convention.”48 
The 1879 convention was dominated by a split between the Work-
ingmen’s party led by Dennis Kearney and everyone else, both Re-
publicans and Democrats.49  In the judgment of historians Rawls and 
Bean the constitution was not a success:  “In place of an imitative, 
short, and concise document, it produced one that was much more 
original, extraordinarily long, and extremely detailed.  Yet Califor-
nia’s second constitutional convention achieved remarkably little net 
improvement over the first, and virtually every hope of effective re-
form was ultimately disappointed.”50 
Why was the new constitution so much longer than the old?  His-
torian Carl Swisher pointed to the low opinion in which the state leg-
islature was held by delegates.  “[T]he delegates looked upon them-
selves as more truly the representatives of ‘the people’ than any 
subsequently chosen legislators, and thought it their duty to include a 
large amount of important legislation in the constitution, where it 
 
 44 Burns, supra note 37, at 10. 
 45 SCHRAG, supra note 4, at 201. 
 46 See Judson A. Grenier, “Officialdom”:  California State Government, 1849–1879, in TAMING 
THE ELEPHANT, supra note 37, at 137 (explaining that Californians were disillusioned by 
the excesses of government officials for years prior to the 1879 convention). 
 47 Id. at 145. 
 48 Id. at 147. 
 49 See RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 15, at 196. 
 50 Id. at 197. 
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would not be easily subject to change.”51  The “delegates regarded the 
legislature as a necessary evil, and an expensive one at that.”52  He 
comments:  “If the delegates had come to the convention determined 
to cinch capital, tax mortgages, and expel the Chinese, they were also 
determined to put the legislature in its place.  Session after session 
charges of incompetence and corruption had been made against the 
legislature, not always without reason.”53 
At the same time, at least in Swisher’s judgment, delegates did not 
free themselves from the sort of motives that drove state legislators.54  
The sorry record of the convention indicates that the delegates did 
not have a good understanding of the problems facing the state or 
sound ideas about possible solutions.  One of the reasons the 1787 
Federal Convention was successful was that the delegates had exten-
sive experience with American state and national government.  They 
also had thought about possible solutions and discussed those before 
the convention began.  By contrast, prior to the California conven-
tion, “there was little intelligent consideration given to the question 
of what might be legitimately expected to be achieved by revision of 
the fundamental law of the state.”55  Swisher concludes with respect to 
the convention’s impact: 
The constitution was intended to be a piece of fundamental legislation 
which would of itself immediately reorganize and redirect the political 
life of the state.  Instead, in the light of a retrospect of fifty years, it seems 
to have been only one skirmish in a series of battles that have raged dur-
ing and since the decade of the seventies.56 
The Constitution of 1879 failed to achieve any of its goals.  It did not 
result in effective railroad regulation, tax relief for farmers, help for 
workers, or (thankfully) exclusion of the Chinese.57  However, it re-
mains California’s foundational law.58 
 
 51 CARL BRENT SWISHER, MOTIVATION AND POLITICAL TECHNIQUE IN THE CALIFORNIA 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 1878–79, at 65 (Da Capo Press 1969) (1930). 
 52 Id. at 96. 
 53 Id. 
 54 See id. at 85 (“Throughout the discussion of all the diverse provisions of taxation it was 
strikingly evident that the delegates were not seeking to discover or to apply any funda-
mental principles of public finance.  They were concerned primarily with shifting from 
themselves and their constituents as much as possible of the burden of taxation.  The mo-
tive, throughout, was economic self interest . . . .”). 
 55 Id. at 18. 
 56 Id. at 114. 
 57 See Burns, supra note 37, at 13 (noting that “the new constitution did little” to advance the 
drafters’ initial interests). 
 58 See id. at 16 (explaining how, in spite of numerous amendments, the 1879 Constitution 
affects modern California). 
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Most important for our story, the new constitution did not im-
prove the reputation of the state legislature.  By the 1880s, criticism 
of the legislature for abuse of the patronage system and the use of 
special legislation that benefited particular lobbyists and businessmen 
was common.59  State legislators were not well paid and this made 
them easy prey for well financed lobbyists. 
Members of the Founding Generation might have been able to 
diagnose what was wrong with the Californian political system.  By 
traditional republican standards, California lacked the kind of politi-
cal economy necessary to support representative government.  Civic 
republicans such as Thomas Jefferson believed that good government 
flowed from the ready availability of land.60  Widespread freehold 
ownership would guarantee the existence of a republican political 
order.  Yet in California, land ownership was concentrated and citi-
zens complained of a land monopoly.61  A middle class of yeoman 
farmers never developed.  From an eighteenth century point of view, 
the prospects were never good that republican government would 
function as well on the Pacific coast as it did on the Atlantic.62 
The operations of the Southern Pacific made the attainment of 
republican government even more difficult.  Historian Kevin Starr 
writes that the railroad “offered the most obvious instance of what 
was grossly wrong with California:  a very few of the super-rich virtu-
ally owned the state—its land, its economy, its government—and were 
running it as a private preserve.”63  In 1883, hundreds of letters be-
tween Collis Huntington and associate David Colton dating from 
1874 to 1878 were made public in the course of a lawsuit.  “The bulk 
of these letters dealt with the delicate matter of bribing Washington 
 
 59 See DONALD J. PISANI, FROM THE FAMILY FARM TO AGRIBUSINESS:  THE IRRIGATION CRUSADE 
IN CALIFORNIA AND THE WEST, 1850–1931, at 21–24 (1984) (listing examples of patronage 
positions and press denunciations of the patronage system). 
 60 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY:  COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY 
IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776–1970, at 30–34 (1997) (describing property rights as 
a foundational aspect of Jeffersonian civic republicanism); DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE 
REPUBLIC:  POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA 186 (1980) (listing “an unob-
structed access to an ample supply of open land” as central to Jefferson’s conception of a 
sustainable political economy). 
 61 PISANI, supra note 59, at 11–15; see also OLIN, supra note 26, at 27–28 (illustrating the ve-
hement public outcry over land monopoly). 
 62 In his important historical study, Thomas Goebel argues that “[t]he vision that inspired 
many direct democracy reformers was a distinctly economic one, that of a republic of 
small independent producers freely competing in an unfettered marketplace.”  GOEBEL, 
supra note 3, at 5. 
 63 STARR, supra note 26, at 199. 
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congressmen and Sacramento legislators to favor pro-railroad legisla-
tion.”64 
During the legislative session that began in January 1907, the citi-
zens of the state were informed by the press that “no important ac-
tion was taken in either house without the sanction of [the] three top 
members of the Southern Pacific’s legislative directorate.”65  Kevin 
Starr comments, “[t]he last four years of the [Southern Pacific]’s 
control over California were the most flagrant.  Certainly the legisla-
ture of 1907 set new records for influence-peddling and outright 
bribery.”66  The progressive editor of the Fresno Republican concluded 
that “[t]he state had lost . . . the things for which the Revolutionary 
and Civil wars were fought.  Unless California arose and overthrew 
corrupt corporation government as Wisconsin had done, then its 
peoples were not fit for self-government.”67  California was ready for 
change.68 
The elite group of progressives that met after this sorry legislative 
performance to form the Lincoln-Roosevelt League were in favor of 
many specific reforms such as “the direct primary, the initiative, ref-
erendum, and recall, the regulation of utility rates, conservation of 
forests, the outlawing of race-track gambling, a workmen’s compensa-
tion law, woman suffrage, a blue-sky law, and a minimum-wage law for 
women.”69  But the first plank in their platform was to emancipate 
“the Republican Party in California from domination by the Political 
Bureau of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company.”70  From the per-
spective of the progressives, the entire political system was the captive 
of a particularly powerful special interest, and on this point they were 
indisputably correct. 
Californians thus had good reason to believe that something had 
gone terribly wrong with representative government.  But does this 
indicate a problem with the representative principle itself?  Defend-
ers of representative democracy would surely say not.  We should 
keep in mind, however, that the Founding Generation believed that 
the maintenance of a republican constitutional order rested on a cer-
 
 64 Id. at 202. 
 65 MOWRY, supra note 26, at 63; see also STARR, supra note 26, at 205 (discussing the high level 
of Southern Pacific’s control over California). 
 66 STARR, supra note 26, at 205. 
 67 MOWRY, supra note 26, at 65. 
 68 See DEVERELL, supra note 27, at 150 (discussing the origins of the California progressive 
movement). 
 69 MOWRY, supra note 26, at 70. 
 70 Id. 
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tain form of political economy.  If those economic conditions did not 
obtain, the existence of republican government was threatened.  Ap-
plying this eighteenth-century logic to California, we can infer that 
constitutionalism in the Golden State was under siege from the be-
ginning.  By this logic there was too little available farmland and an 
urban area (San Francisco) that was far too large.71  This analysis can 
be pushed further.  Eighteenth-century republican theory could not 
take the measure of corporate power.  According to Eldon Eisenach, 
leading progressive social thinkers did not (and could not) turn to 
the American constitutional tradition for help.72  The eighteenth-
century inheritance was too meager to be of much use in new cir-
cumstances. 
Whether judged by the standards of the eighteenth or early twen-
tieth century, then, the California constitutional system came up 
short.  In California, the conditions for republican government did 
not obtain.  Further, the giant corporation had intruded into the 
constitutional sphere.  There was no obvious way to “check and bal-
ance” the power of the Southern Pacific by using the theories of the 
Founding Generation.  California progressives thus had to find their 
own way. 
It should be appreciated that the conclusions reached by progres-
sives in California were shared by their counterparts in other states.73  
As recounted by historian Thomas Goebel, there was increasing skep-
ticism during the nineteenth century concerning the competence of 
state legislatures:  “Americans severely weakened state legislatures, 
adopted the popular ratification of new state constitutions and 
amendments, and increasingly resorted to popular referenda to de-
cide crucial issues.”74  Direct democracy was the next logical step as 
corporate influence persisted over the legislative process.75  Historian 
 
 71 San Francisco had 23% of the total population of the state in 1890.  See DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, TWELFTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES, TAKEN IN THE YEAR 1900, at 2, 432, 
available at http://www2.census.gov/prod2/decennial/documents/33405927v1_TOC.pdf 
(reporting California’s population as 1,485,053 and San Francisco’s as 342,782). 
 72 See ELDON J. EISENACH, THE LOST PROMISE OF PROGRESSIVISM 106–07 (1994) (“Constitu-
tional law and the leading lights of American legal scholarship were treated by Progres-
sive intellectuals with studied neglect as a kind of fossilized and symbiotic complement to 
the party system, which, in turn, they treated with studied contempt.”). 
 73 For a careful review of the states that adopted direct democracy in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, see STEVEN L. PIOTT, GIVING VOTERS A VOICE:  THE ORIGINS 
OF THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN AMERICA (2003). 
 74 GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 14. 
 75 Id. at 115. 
 
564 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 11:3 
 
Steven Piott noted the existence of a “sense of overwhelming frustra-
tion”76 with the existing political system: 
Convinced that their elected representatives had failed to respond to 
changes that affected their lives as taxpayers, citizens, workers, or farm-
ers, and that they had allowed a disproportionate share of political power 
to be held by special interests, voters concluded that the nature of politi-
cal participation would have to be redefined.77 
However, advocates of direct democracy generally did not reject rep-
resentative government.  They made clear that the devices of the 
popular initiative and referendum were supplements to representa-
tive democracy, not replacements.78 
John Dinan has examined the general reasons behind the adop-
tion of direct democracy in his comprehensive review of state consti-
tutional conventions.  His discussion shows that delegates believed 
they had good reason to reject the reliance of Madison and the other 
Founders on representative institutions.  “State constitution makers 
concluded, in the first place, that Madison was too sanguine about 
the capacity of representative institutions to combat the problem of 
minority faction.”79  That is, state legislatures could too easily be 
dominated by interest groups.  Second, the structure of a representa-
tive system meant that it was too easy for office holders to feather 
their own nests at public expense through patronage and the like.80  
Third, legislatures were refusing to address long-standing issues of 
public importance.81  Dinan concludes:  “[T]he adoption of direct 
democratic institutions at the state level was not the result of instinc-
tive and undeliberative acts, but rather was the product of long-
standing concerns about deficiencies in representative institutions 
and a belief that existing institutional arrangements were incapable 
of remedying these problems.”82 
This account of the origins of direct democracy in California 
shows that it was far from an ill-considered deviation from the consti-
tutional tradition of representative government.  It was rather a ra-
tional response forced by the repeated failure of representative gov-
ernment over a period of decades.  This does not establish that direct 
democracy was the best solution to the problems of representative 
 
 76 PIOTT, supra note 73, at 255. 
 77 Id. at 251. 
 78 GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 55. 
 79 DINAN, supra note 10, at 95. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 95–96. 
 82 Id. at 96. 
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government.  But it does show we need to take direct democracy seri-
ously as a meaningful response to the breakdown of the Founders’ 
system of governance. 
II.  DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF TRUST IN GOVERNMENT 
In A Theory of Justice, the great political philosopher John Rawls de-
fined the idea of a well-ordered society as one that generates its own 
psychological and moral support.83  Such a society is said by Rawls to 
be stable when it is able to generate a sense of justice that is able to 
counter tendencies toward injustice.84  Extending Rawls’s concept to 
the political sphere, we could say that a system of representation is 
stable when it is able to generate its own support over time.  That is, 
citizens believe the system taken on balance tends to satisfy widely ac-
cepted norms of how legislators should behave and how the legisla-
ture and executive should make policy. 
The history of the origins of direct democracy recounted in Part I 
supports the conclusion that California’s system of representation 
failed the test of stability after only a few decades.  Ultimately, the 
state legislature was unable to satisfy public expectations and so gen-
erate support for the system of representation.  In response, Califor-
nia evolved a robust alternative system of governance or constitu-
tional order.  The evolution of direct democracy in California (and 
most likely elsewhere) therefore cannot be understood properly 
without taking into consideration the failure of representative institu-
tions to accomplish one of their most basic tasks. 
Direct democracy may well be seriously flawed on both theoretical 
and practical grounds.  Yet so long as the public views the representa-
tive process as equally flawed, there is little likelihood that its popu-
larity will diminish.  This suggests that instead of devoting attention 
solely to the problems with direct democracy, we should inquire into 
the reasons why its de facto partner, the system of electoral represen-
tation, has proven to be so unsatisfactory.  That is the focus of this 
part of the Article. 
 
 83 JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 397–98 (rev. ed. 1999). 
 84 See id. at 398 (“Now a well-ordered society is also regulated by its public conception of 
justice.”). 
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A.  Direct Democracy in Contemporary California 
Interest in initiatives has waxed and waned in California politics, 
although it has never disappeared entirely.  Thomas Goebel records: 
Direct democracy . . . immediately became a widely popular and exten-
sively used part of state government. . . . During the 1910s, 30 initiatives 
qualified for the ballot, 35 during the 1920s, and 36 in the 1930s.  After 
1940, the number of initiatives dropped sharply, to 20 in the 1940s, 12 in 
the 1950s, and an all-time low of 9 in the 1960s, before the rise of new so-
cial movements launched a sharp rise after 1970.85 
He notes that the initiative did not seem to lead to the adoption of 
radical laws.86  Rather, it became an additional instrument of interest 
group politics.87  Interestingly, Goebel concludes:  “Because the exis-
tence of direct democracy offered pressure groups and citizens addi-
tional means to shape the political agenda, California voters were di-
rectly confronted with options and policy alternatives not present in 
many other states.”88 
Experienced observers of California politics have recognized that 
the persistent use of the initiative is linked to the public’s low opinion 
of representative government.89  As California journalist Peter Schrag 
puts it, “During the two decades since the passage of [Proposition] 
13, California has been in nearly constant revolt against representa-
tive government.”90  Proposition 13, the most famous initiative in U.S. 
history,91 was the property tax-cutting measure that passed in 1978 by 
a margin of 65%-to-35%.  It was preceded by a decline in public con-
fidence in government92 and “set the stage for the Reagan era, and 
became both fact and symbol of a radical shift in governmental pri-
orities, public attitudes, and social relationships that is as nearly fun-
damental in American politics as the changes brought by the New 
Deal.”93 
 
 85 GOEBEL, supra note 3, at 141. 
 86 Id. at 148. 
 87 Id. at 153. 
 88 Id. at 171. 
 89 For a study that links the initiative to ongoing political distrust, see BALDASSARE, supra 
note 7, at 12–13, 46–53. 
 90 SCHRAG, supra note 4, at 9–10. 
 91 See Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler, Responsive or Responsible Government?, in CITIZENS AS 
LEGISLATORS, supra note 1, 249, 254. 
 92 See MARK BALDASSARE, A CALIFORNIA STATE OF MIND:  THE CONFLICTED VOTER IN A 
CHANGING WORLD 45–46 (2002) (“We believe that the main factor in explaining the tax 
revolt is distrust in government.”). 
 93 SCHRAG, supra note 4, at 132. 
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High property taxes had been a political issue in California for 
roughly a decade prior to the passage of Proposition 13.94  There was 
therefore no question of a sudden new issue for state legislators.  In 
the end, the state legislature and political leaders proved unrespon-
sive on an issue critical to voters.95  This “reinforced the public’s scorn 
for the legislature and government in general and created a vacuum 
that made the passage of Proposition 13 possible, even likely.”96  De-
spite years of controversy over the effects of Proposition 13, it contin-
ues to be popular and resonates with voters as a valuable limit on 
government.97 
The passage of Proposition 13 created a new era for direct democ-
racy in California.  Other ballot propositions that restricted the ability 
of state government to tax and spend followed quickly.98  According 
to Elisabeth Gerber, “Between 1974 and 1990, California voters con-
sidered 73 statewide initiatives, of which 32 passed.  These initiatives 
covered policy areas as diverse as taxation, insurance regulation, gov-
ernment reform, gambling, environmental policy, criminal law, and 
school funding.”99  Not all initiatives led in the direction of less gov-
ernment.  Environmental initiatives were popular in the 1970s, such 
as the much noted Coastal Zone Protection Act, a temporary measure 
that was later replaced by legislation.100  Here again, the perception 
was that the state legislature had proved incapable of addressing an 
important policy problem.101 
 
 94 See ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 102–09 (detailing the history of tax-reform initiatives and 
propositions in the years immediately prior to the passage of Proposition 13). 
 95 See SCHRAG, supra note 4, at 142–45 (describing the legislative inertia on tax reform in the 
face of popular political pressure). 
 96 ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 109. 
 97 See BALDASSARE, supra note 7, at 88–91 (showing that “only one in four Californians” feel 
that Proposition 13 negatively affected government services). 
 98 See ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 109–19 (detailing efforts by anti-tax activists in the wake of 
Proposition 13); Bruce E. Cain et al., Constitutional Change:  Is It Too Easy to Amend Our 
State Constitution?, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 13, at 265, 287 
(linking the success of Proposition 13 with the success of subsequent tax-reform initia-
tives). 
 99 Elisabeth R. Gerber, Reforming the California Initiative Process:  A Proposal to Increase Flexibility 
and Legislative Accountability, in CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, supra note 13, at 
291 (footnote omitted). 
100 See ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 136–37 (explaining the origins of the Coastal Zone Protec-
tion Act). 
101 See id. at 136 (linking the Coastal Zone Protection Act’s origin to legislative failures in the 
early 1970s). 
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Another ballot measure that indicated dissatisfaction with the leg-
islature was Proposition 140 in 1990, which established term limits for 
legislators.  “The support for Proposition 140 was a measure of wide-
spread voter dissatisfaction with the workings of state government.  
Many Californians had become convinced that the state legislature 
was dominated by powerful special interests and was hopelessly out of 
touch with the concerns of average citizens.”102  Californians contin-
ued to have a low opinion of the state legislature in the 1990s.103  A 
number of initiatives that drew attention were the result of legislative 
inaction.  Reform of bilingual education was blocked in the legisla-
ture by politicians responsive to the Latino community and teachers’ 
unions.104 
As ballot propositions became common, politicians realized they 
could use them as part of their overall strategy.  Governor Pete Wil-
son used the initiative process to build wedge issues that would help 
him get reelected (Proposition 187 on illegal immigration) and fur-
ther his presidential ambitions (Proposition 209 on affirmative ac-
tion).105  Perhaps to Wilson’s surprise, Proposition 187 caused a back-
lash among Latinos, spurring many to register to vote and waking the 
“sleeping giant” of their political power.106 
What of the continued use of the initiative process in the present?  
What survey research shows is that like citizens in the rest of the 
United States, Californians do not trust their legislature and continue 
to approve of the mechanisms of direct democracy.107  According to 
political scientist Mark Baldassare, “Voters often prefer to turn to citi-
zens’ initiatives to make public policies because of their impatience 
with the speed of the legislative process and their distrust of the deci-
sions that politicians make.”108 
 
102 RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 15, at 468. 
103 Id. at 471. 
104 See BRODER, supra note 2, at 169–70 (“[T]he Democrats who controlled the assembly and 
state senate responded to two pressures—leaders of the Latino community . . . and the 
teachers’ unions . . . .”). 
105 RAWLS & BEAN, supra note 15, at 470–71. 
106 Id. at 550. 
107 BALDASSARE, supra note 92, at 121. 
108 Id. (citation omitted).  A 1998 survey showed that “Californians by a 3-to-1 margin chose 
initiatives over reliance on the governor and the state legislature to pass laws.”  
BALDASSARE, supra note 7, at 84–85. 
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To be sure, there has been real frustration and severe criticism di-
rected against the use of the initiative in California.109  Tellingly, Bal-
dassare remarks that “many elected officials and political observers 
would like to see the initiative process just go away.”110  This is unlikely 
because the initiative remains popular.111  A detailed 1997 poll 
showed continued support for the initiative, as “72 percent of re-
spondents said that they were a good thing for the state.”112  It should 
be noted that even critics of the initiative admit that the state legisla-
ture has not always acted responsibly.113 
The use of direct democracy continues unabated.  In 2005, Gov-
ernor Arnold Schwarzenegger, himself the product of an unprece-
dented recall election,114 ordered a special election to allow California 
voters to remake their constitutional order through the initiative 
process.115  Some observers have announced the advent of “hybrid 
democracy”116 in which citizens, political parties, and politicians in the 
legislative and executive branches all use both the legislative process 
and the tools of direct democracy to achieve their ends.  Baldassare 
concludes: 
The roots of this political change are found in four trends evident in re-
cent California politics—the public’s support for a populist approach to 
policy making and their basic distrust of government, along with wide-
spread concerns about the influence of partisanship and special interests 
on decisions made by their elected representatives.117 
By this point, these factors should strike us as familiar. 
 
109 See ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 245–49 (“Most initiative measures are ultimately decided 
by a small and unrepresentative body of voters. . . . [whose] laws . . . are often badly 
drawn, extreme, and subject to judicial revocation.”).  See generally SCHRAG, supra note 4 
(describing inadequacies and deficiencies present in California’s initiative system).  For a 
recent example of criticism from political science, see Thad Kousser & Mathew D. 
McCubbins, Social Choice, Crypto-Initiatives, and Policymaking by Direct Democracy, 78 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 949 (2005). 
110 BALDASSARE, supra note 92, at 252. 
111 See BRODER, supra note 2, at 208 (providing polling numbers illustrative of the popularity 
of the initiative process). 
112 ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 236. 
113 See SCHRAG, supra note 4, at 13, 201–06. 
114 For discussion of the recall of Governor Gray Davis and election of Governor Schwar-
zenegger, see MARK BALDASSARE & CHERYL KATZ, THE COMING AGE OF DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY:  CALIFORNIA’S RECALL AND BEYOND (2008).  For a discussion of Schwar-
zenegger’s strategic use of the initiative, see Elizabeth Garrett, The Promise and Perils of Hy-
brid Democracy, 59 OKLA. L. REV. 227 (2006). 
115 Jordan Rau, Governor Puts Agenda on the Ballot, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at 1. 
116 BALDASSARE & KATZ, supra note 114, at 211; see also Garrett, supra note 1. 
117 BALDASSARE & KATZ, supra note 114, at 219. 
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It is thus reasonable to ask how representative government in Cali-
fornia got so badly off the track.  Table 1 in the Appendix lists illus-
trative California initiatives that were approved between 1978 and 
1998.  What this chart suggests is that there were some extraordinarily 
popular policy measures that were never taken up or acted upon by 
the state legislature.  How could this happen in a representative sys-
tem?  Some initiatives, such as one proposing to designate English as 
the official language, might have related to an unusual split between 
mass and elite opinion—leaders of both parties opposed this proposi-
tion, yet it was approved by an overwhelming majority.118  Still others, 
such as those addressing term limits, had to do with governance ques-
tions on which politicians are unlikely to vote against what they per-
ceive as their own interests. 
But the overall record cautions those who take an uncritical stance 
toward representative democracy.  These California initiatives show 
that representative government fails to represent the popular will on 
some issues.  This suggests that the popularity of direct democracy, 
particularly the constitutional initiative in California, is as much a 
story of legislative failure as it is a story of populist uprisings and in-
terest group struggles.  The largely hidden dimension of the story of 
direct democracy in California is that of a state legislature chronically 
unable to satisfy public expectations.  That failure should concern us 
just as much as the problems of direct democracy, and we should in-
quire into its sources. 
Whatever the precise mix of reasons, it is apparent that the ongo-
ing popularity of direct democracy in California has to do with the 
failure of the state’s political institutions to “re-present” popular opin-
ion.  There are obvious similarities in this respect between California 
and the national government in Washington.  Both do not enjoy high 
levels of public trust and trust tends to be lowest for the legislature—
the institution of government that the Framers thought was the most 
representative.  In what follows, I provide a detailed review of the so-
cial science evidence relevant to the decline of trust in the national 
government.  It turns out there is evidence that the decline is linked 
to the performance of democratic institutions, especially legislatures.  
This will help illuminate the debate over direct democracy. 
 
118 ALLSWANG, supra note 1, at 182. 
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B.  The Decline of Trust in Government 
The California experience suggests strongly that there is a link be-
tween use of direct democracy and decreased trust in government.  
As Bruce Cain and Roger Noll argue, “the overriding problem in con-
temporary American government, whether at the local, state, or fed-
eral level, is the perception that government is unresponsive to citi-
zens.  The extensive use of the initiative in California reflects this 
frustration.”119  Bowling Alone,120 Robert Putnam’s well-known study of 
civic engagement and social capital, provides a general introduction 
to the decline of political trust.121  “Americans in the mid-1960s were 
strikingly confident in the benevolence and responsiveness of their 
political institutions.”122  But in contemporary times, the situation is 
reversed.  “In the 1990s roughly three in four Americans didn’t trust 
the government to do what is right most of the time.”123  As Putnam 
describes: 
In April 1966, with the Vietnam War raging and race riots in Cleveland, 
Chicago, and Atlanta, 66 percent of Americans rejected the view that the 
people running the country don’t really care what happens to you.  In 
December 1997, in the midst of the longest period of peace and prosper-
ity in more than two generations, 57 percent of Americans endorsed that 
same view.124 
Gary Orren observes that changes in political leadership have not 
made a difference.125  “For three decades, administrations have come 
and gone, and polling charts have bounced up and down in response 
to this leader or that policy, yet public trust has tumbled ever down-
ward, regardless of which party has been in power.”126  A cynicism that 
has lasted this long must be “fueled by a deeper set of accumulated 
grievances with political authority, institutions, and processes in gen-
eral.”127  Using evidence from the National Election Studies (“NES”), 
 
119 Bruce E. Cain & Roger G. Noll, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN CALIFORNIA, 
supra note 13, at 2. 
120 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE:  THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY (2000). 
121 Putnam’s chief concern is social trust, the trust we have in other people, not trust in gov-
ernment.  Id. at 137.  He notes that trust in government is not the same thing as social 
trust.  Id. 
122 Id. at 47. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
125 Gary Orren, Fall from Grace:  The Public’s Loss of Faith in Government, in WHY PEOPLE DON’T 
TRUST GOVERNMENT 77, 81 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter WHY PEOPLE 
DON’T TRUST GOVERNMENT]. 
126 Id. at 78. 
127 Id. at 79. 
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Orren shows that trust in government was above 70% in the late 
1950s and early 1960s.128  “Trust fell by a full 15 percentage points 
from 1964 to 1968, years of intense racial turbulence and turmoil 
over Vietnam during Lyndon Johnson’s administration, and then an-
other 8 percent in the first two years of Richard Nixon’s presi-
dency.”129  Orren wonders how this could be the case given that this 
period was one of great national and legislative accomplishment.130 
“Public satisfaction [with government] has improved only twice 
since 1964 . . . .”131  Once was during President Reagan’s first term 
when he began delivering on his economic promises.132  The second 
occurred in 1996, as President Clinton concluded his first term.133  
The economy was doing well, the deficit was reduced, and crime rates 
dropped.134  The administration pursued a policy of centrism, which 
sat well with moderate voters.135 
Russell Dalton agrees with Putnam and Orren in his review of the 
evidence.136  NES surveys showed high levels of support up until the 
mid-1960s, when there was a break and a precipitous decline.137  He 
attributes this to the divisive political issues of the time such as civil 
rights, Vietnam, and Watergate.138  The Reagan presidency temporar-
ily reversed these trends and trust went up in 1984.139  But further de-
clines occurred and by 1994, the NES surveys recorded historically 
low levels of trust.  At that point, “[o]nly 22 per cent of the American 
public felt one could trust the government to do the right thing most 
of the time, only 20 per cent believed the government is run for the 
benefit of all, and only 48 per cent thought most government officials 
were honest.”140 
 
128 Id. at 80. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 90. 
131 Id. at 105. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 105–06. 
135 Id. at 106. 
136 See Russell J. Dalton, Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies, in CRITICAL 
CITIZENS:  GLOBAL SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 57 (Pippa Norris ed., 1999). 
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Because so many social scientists rely on them, the NES questions 
are worth a closer look.  The “trust battery” in the NES is composed 
of four questions: 141 
Trust.  How much of the time do you think you can trust the govern-
ment in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the 
time, or only some of the time? 
Waste.  Do you think that people in government waste a lot of the 
money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don’t waste very much of it? 
Interest.  Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few 
big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of 
all the people? 
Crooked.  Do you think that quite a few of the people running the 
government are crooked, not very many are, or do you think hardly any 
of them are crooked?142 
From a republican and constitutionalist perspective, the two most 
relevant questions are those dealing with trust and interest.  Whether 
the federal government is best regarded as activist or limited, it will 
be difficult for it to accomplish any goal, no matter how worthy, with-
out a modicum of trust.  In addition, ideally we want a republican 
and democratic government to be run for the benefit of all the peo-
ple, not simply a small self-interested elite. 
The NES trust battery was first posed (with some very slight varia-
tion in the phrasing of the interest and crooked questions) in the 
1958 post-congressional election survey.143  The trust and interest 
questions reappeared in the 1964 survey and have been asked in 
nearly every survey since (the trust question has been asked in every 
survey since 1964).144  John Alford thus argues that the key measure in 
the NES is the trust question.145  The NES trust question data show 
that people saying they trust government in Washington most or all 
of the time increased from 1958 to 1964, then decreased from nearly 
80% in 1964 to just below 70% in 1966.146  There was a further steady 
drop to around 55% in 1970, a leveling off in 1972, then a steep drop 
 
141 I borrow this way of listing the questions from Marc Hetherington.  See MARC J. 
HETHERINGTON, WHY TRUST MATTERS:  DECLINING POLITICAL TRUST AND THE DEMISE OF 
AMERICAN LIBERALISM 14 (2005). 
142 Id. 
143 The survey is available at the NES website, ftp://ftp.electionstudies.org/ftp/
nes/studypages/1958post/pstq1958.pdf (last visited Feb. 15, 2009). 
144 See John R. Alford, We’re All in this Together:  The Decline of Trust in Government, 1958–1996, 
in WHAT IS IT ABOUT GOVERNMENT THAT AMERICANS DISLIKE? 28, 29–30 (John R. Hibbing 
& Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds., 2001) [hereinafter AMERICANS DISLIKE?]. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 31. 
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to less than 40% in 1974.147  The most or all of the time score bot-
tomed out in 1980 at less than 30%.148  Trust then rose, peaking at 
over 40% in 1984 and leveling off.149  But there was a further drop to 
less than 30% in 1990 and a new low of near 20% in 1994, before a 
small increase to over 30% in 1996.150 
The shocking terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 did not lead 
to a permanent reversal of this decades-long decline in trust.  As Marc 
Hetherington explains, trust in government went up after 9/11, but it 
also eroded quickly.151  “In June 2002, with the September 11 attacks 
nine months in the past, trust in government dropped to the same 
level recorded in the 2000 NES.”152  After 9/11 trust in government 
increased, but only to Clinton-era levels.153  Not exactly a return to the 
1960s. 
Social scientists have analyzed and debated the reasons for the de-
cline and subsequent minor recovery in levels of trust.  What they 
have not done very often is ask why the trust Americans had in the 
federal government has never returned to the levels enjoyed in the 
early and mid-1960s.  In addition, they have not focused with suffi-
cient precision on the decline that occurred from 1964 to 1966.  The 
NES shows trust actually increased from 1958 to 1964.  Why did the 
decline begin after 1964, a well-known period of great executive-
legislative partnership and accomplishment? 
The high tide of President Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society was 
the passage of the Voting Rights Act in August 1965.  Yet this appears 
to be the point at which Americans began to lose confidence in the 
performance of the federal government.  Further, Americans appar-
ently feel that no matter what the government has done since, no 
matter who is in charge, no matter what policies are enacted, nothing 
has merited a fundamental change in their lack of trust in govern-
ment.  Is the record of government since 1965 really this bad?  Are we 
looking at forty years of unremitting failure? 
Perhaps there are reasons for so thinking.  But such a permanent 
decline in a key indicator is arguably a clue about the nature of the 
constitutional order that took hold in the 1960s and continues today.  
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plicate the legitimacy of fundamental constitutional institutions.154  
There is no evidence that the public disapproves of the Constitution, 
important constitutional concepts such as the separation of powers, 
or wishes any constitutional institution abolished or changed signifi-
cantly.  However, a persistent lack of trust can still be regarded as sig-
nificant from a constitutional perspective.  The public may still be-
lieve in the Constitution, but relentless distrust puts government, in 
effect, on a starvation diet in terms of the public authority it needs to 
operate effectively.155 
We therefore need to examine the kind of constitutional order 
that existed in the early 1960s and ask whether existing explanations 
for the initial decline in trust are adequate.  If they are not, we should 
go further and inquire whether an explanation might be developed 
that would fit the circumstances of the decline more closely. 
C.  The 1960s and the Permanent Decline of Political Trust 
A number of scholars cite Vietnam as the explanation for the ini-
tial decline in trust shown in the 1966 NES.  In their helpful review of 
the literature, Margaret Levi and Laura Stoker comment that “the 
decline in trust from the 1960s to the 1970s was fueled by citizens’ re-
actions to the war in Vietnam, Watergate, and civil rights initia-
tives.”156  Joseph Nye argues that it is unlikely that the initial decline of 
trust in the 1960s was related to poor economic performance.  Dur-
ing this period, economic growth was generally strong.157  Vietnam 
and Watergate, he says, help explain how the decline began, but not 
why it is still going on.158  Of course, these are general observations.  
Watergate did not occupy the attention of the American public until 
1973.  Vietnam and civil rights fit the timeline more precisely, but 
there are some problems, as I will discuss below. 
 
154 See id. at 14–15; see also Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & Philip D. Zelikow, Conclusion:  Reflections, Con-
jectures, and Puzzles, in WHY PEOPLE DON’T TRUST GOVERNMENT, supra note 125, at 253, 
277. 
155 See JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, STEALTH DEMOCRACY:  AMERICANS’ 
BELIEFS ABOUT HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD WORK 210–11 (2002). 
156 Margaret Levi & Laura Stoker, Political Trust and Trustworthiness, 3 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 
475, 480–81 (2000). 
157 Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Introduction:  The Decline of Confidence in Government to WHY PEOPLE 
DON’T TRUST GOVERNMENT, supra note 125, at 1, 10–11. 
158 Id. at 15. 
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Nye and Philip Zelikow have made some valuable observations 
about the nature of the explanation that has to be provided for the 
decline of trust in government.159  The explanation has to fit the tim-
ing and onset of the decline.  They believe that Vietnam and Water-
gate work quite well explaining the onset of the decline.160  But Nye 
and Zelikow are somewhat careless here.  As we have seen, there is a 
significant decline in trust from 1964 to 1966.  But this is prior to the 
period in which Vietnam becomes a nationally contentious issue. 
Although Vietnam and Watergate were precipitating events,161 Nye 
and Zelikow argue that there were deeper causes.  One was a trans-
formation in the nature of the economy, which they summarize as the 
“Third Industrial Revolution.”162  There was a developing sense of the 
dangers of globalization and a loss of control over the economy as a 
whole.163  The second was a change in social-cultural attitudes, stem-
ming from government intervention in social relations, such as civil 
rights and gender relations.164  There were also negative effects from 
media reporting about government.165  They summarize: 
The short form of this story is that historical events in the 1960s and 
early 1970s (Vietnam and Watergate) precipitated a drop in confidence 
in the U.S. government, but the effects (as well as the cross-national ana-
logues) have been broader and long-lasting because of (1) long-term 
secular changes in sociocultural attitudes toward authority and tradi-
tional social order that came to a head in the 1960s; (2) profound eco-
nomic changes caused by the information revolution and globalization; 
(3) changes in the political process that increased the distance between 
the political activists and the public; and (4) a more consistently negative 
approach by the press to government and other institutions.  Together, 
these changes have reinforced a popular culture of bad government.166 
In an insightful article, John Alford has argued that we need bet-
ter explanations why the decline in trust occurred.167  The decline oc-
curred across all political institutions and all lines of party, ideology, 
race, income, and region.168  Institution-specific and policy-specific 
explanations are inadequate to explain the decline.169  He comments: 
 
159 See Nye & Zelikow, supra note 154, at 253. 
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[M]y argument here is that it is time to take the details of the actual 
trends in trust seriously and to stop asserting that we all know why trust in 
government declined in the sixties and seventies when in fact we have no 
explanation that is compatible with the details of what we know about the 
decline itself.170 
Alford notes that there was no rise in general cynicism in the pe-
riod in question.171  Perhaps distrust of government is the public’s 
“natural state.”172  This hypothesis would shift the focus to asking why 
trust in government increased, presumably during the 1950s or per-
haps earlier.  Alford answers by posing a broad historical explanation.  
An external threat to the country could cause citizens to rally around 
the government.173  He notes that: 
In 1960 over 60% of the respondents cite foreign policy or defense as the 
number one problem [facing the nation].  By 1974 this has fallen into 
single digits and remains there through 1978.  Likewise, trust in govern-
ment takes its dramatic plunge over this same period.174 
The 1950s and early 1960s, the height of the Cold War, could plausi-
bly be characterized as a period in which Americans perceived an ex-
ternal threat from the Soviet Union and China.  Perhaps this was an 
unusual period during which foreign policy and defense matters took 
precedence over the normal dominance of domestic issues.  But why 
would a return to domestic issues lead to a decline in trust? 
These observations are helpful, if somewhat preliminary.  But 
even these astute scholars do not focus with sufficient care on the 
1964–66 period.  Why does the decline in trust start here?  Vietnam 
will not work as an explanation.  There is no evidence of general pub-
lic opposition to the war during 1966, the key year in question.175  The 
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution (arguably) authorizing the Vietnam War 
occurred in August 1964 and President Johnson’s fateful decision to 
escalate the war into a major commitment did not come until July 
1965.176  The famous hearings held by Senator William Fulbright criti-
cizing the premises of the war were held in January 1966, but did not 
presage any fundamental shift in public opinion.177  There was a nega-
 
170 Id. at 42–43. 
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173 Id. at 45. 
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175 JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS:  THE UNITED STATES, 1945–1974, at 598, 629 
(1996). 
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tive shift in public opinion in 1967,178 but as late as mid-1967, a major-
ity of the public still supported the war.179 
Was this period one in which the government was perceived as do-
ing nothing about important national problems?  Of course the op-
posite is the case.  The period in question begins with LBJ’s over-
whelming electoral victory over Republican candidate Senator Barry 
Goldwater.  Johnson had already swung into action during the sum-
mer of 1964 by winning passage of a tax cut, the war on poverty, and 
the Civil Rights Act.180  Johnson followed up his electoral victory with 
one of the most productive sessions of Congress in history, winning 
passage of federal aid to education, Medicare and Medicaid, immi-
gration reform, and the Voting Rights Act, as well as various pollution 
control and natural resources measures.181 
Perhaps LBJ and the Democratic Congress were wrong to think 
that all this liberal activism was what the public wanted.  Yet with one 
important exception, there is no evidence that these measures were 
unpopular.  Certainly they were not repealed in forthcoming decades 
and, indeed, the scope of many of these policy initiatives was ex-
tended.  The exception is civil rights legislation.  If we cast around for 
a group that was dissatisfied with the course of national policy in this 
period, it appears Southern whites might qualify.  They were the 
group, after all, whose preferences concerning racial policy were con-
sistently defeated.  Marc Hetherington notes:  “From 1964 to 1970, 
when the reach of civil rights legislation was largely confined to the 
South, southerners were less trustful of the federal government than 
nonsoutherners, although the gap had begun to close by 1968.”182  
Perhaps the initial decline in trust was led by whites uncomfortable 
with the speed at which the United States was moving into a new era 
of race relations. 
There is historical evidence to support the idea of a white back-
lash that began during the 1964–66 period.  As President Johnson 
and Congress busied themselves passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
Alabama Governor George Wallace was shocking liberals with his ap-
parent appeal to voters in such northern states as Wisconsin.183  Wal-
lace won particular approval among northern whites for his attacks 
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on open housing legislation.184  In this same period, California voters 
passed Proposition 14, repealing the Rumford Fair Housing Act.185  
Liberals could not explain the passage of Proposition 14 any more 
than they could explain Wallace’s popularity.186  It appears relatively 
clear in hindsight, however, that at least some whites thought anti-
discrimination laws were moving too far, too fast.  They saw govern-
ment as taking an aggressive position favoring the rights of blacks 
over whites, rather than establishing equal justice for all.  Whites 
might also have viewed the August 1965 Watts Riot in Los Angeles as 
evidence that government was failing in its basic responsibility to 
maintain order.187 
So it is likely that not everyone was happy with the course of na-
tional policymaking from 1964 to 1966.  Some whites might have be-
gun to express less trust toward the national government because of 
the change in racial policy.  But while these reactionary views may 
help explain the initial decline in trust in government, they do not 
explain its long duration.  Both racial policies and views have evolved 
since the mid-1960s, yet trust in government remains low.  What is 
required is an account that would help explain both why trust de-
clined in the initial 1964–66 period, and also why it did not recover 
the substantial ground lost during the 1964–80 period.  We need to 
maintain a dual focus on both the key initial period of 1964–66 and 
the subsequent fact that trust never returned to the levels enjoyed in 
the early 1960s. 
In developing such an explanation, I believe Alford is right to 
frame the inquiry in historical terms.  The NES data suggest that the 
nation moved from a high-trust to a low-trust era within a short span 
of time.  Further, the initial decline in trust and subsequent duration 
of the decline cannot be explained through an appeal to discrete fac-
tors such as unpopular wars or political scandals.  Something else 
shifted in the background of American politics that created the con-
ditions for a long-term decline in political trust.  I suggest that atten-
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tion should be paid to shifts in the nature of the political and consti-
tutional order. 
D.  The Constitutional Order and the Decline of Political Trust 
My argument is that the decline of political trust is in part the re-
sult of a mismatch between public expectations rooted in the Consti-
tution itself and what the political system can provide.  Trust in gov-
ernment was likely high during the 1940s (although empirical 
evidence is slim) and 1950s, but this period of strong civic belief was 
in a sense artificial.  It was being produced by the consensus behind 
World War II and the Cold War.  Once the Cold War began to ebb 
after 1963, conditions were ripe for a return to “normal” politics.  
Unfortunately, this return occurred in a period of extraordinary do-
mestic political conflict.  Because the American public does not favor 
a politics ridden with conflict,188 trust in government began to de-
cline.  Further, trust stayed low, relative to the levels attained in the 
1950s and early 1960s, because it became apparent that conflict was 
the normal condition of domestic politics.189 
It may be the case that a lack of trust in government is the “natu-
ral” condition of the American polity and that the period of high 
trust and confidence in government in the middle of the twentieth 
century was therefore anomalous.  While I think there is some truth 
in this, the crucial point, the constitutional point, is that low trust can 
lead to instability in a constitutional order characterized by activist 
government.  To put the point another way, low trust is nonfunc-
tional for an activist constitutional order.  In such an order, low trust 
does not lead to a restoration of limited government.  It leads rather 
to bad government and poor policy. 
There are some similarities between this argument and a recent 
thesis about the decline of liberalism made by historian H.W. 
Brands.190  By “liberalism,” Brands means, roughly, the belief that big 
government can solve social problems.  Brands argues that “the liber-
alism that characterized the period from 1945 until the early 1970s 
was anomalous by the standards of American history.  Moreover, this 
anomaly was chiefly the consequence of the predominant feature of 
 
188 See the discussion in ALAN WOLFE, ONE NATION, AFTER ALL:  WHAT MIDDLE-CLASS 
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global politics at the time—the Cold War.”191  During World War II 
and the Cold War, Americans put their traditional distrust of gov-
ernment to one side.192  The Cold War, especially in its first decade, 
was perceived as a real war, and in wartime, the American people 
rally around the national government.193  From Brands’s perspective, 
the decline in trust was triggered by Vietnam.  High levels of trust in 
government were an artifact of the Cold War and “when the Cold 
War cracked up in Vietnam, it shattered the consensus, ravaged 
popular faith in government, and scorched the earth from which the 
liberal agenda had sprung.”194 
Brands’s account is valuable in emphasizing the role of World War 
II and the Cold War in creating the conditions that led to increased 
trust in government.  A number of scholars agree that World War II 
sparked high levels of trust in government.  Robert Putnam points to 
the special nature of the national experience during World War II.195  
There was an “extraordinary burst of civic activity” during and after 
the war because it involved “shared adversity and a shared enemy.”196  
Richard Neustadt contends that trust was high during World War II 
and in the postwar years.197 
While I do not agree that Vietnam was the key event that triggered 
the loss of trust in government,198 Brands does provide a clue about 
the crucial transition period of 1964–66.  He notes that the Cold War 
reached a new pitch of intensity with the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.199  
After the crisis, both sides took steps to defuse tensions and this led to 
a perception, among liberals at least, that the Cold War had changed 
and that domestic issues could assume a new priority.200  It is likely, 
then, that as the initial period of decline began after 1964, the Cold 
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War was no longer delivering the same measure of support for the 
government’s actions. 
In many respects, Marc Hetherington’s detailed study of political 
trust supports my argument.  Hetherington explains the decline of 
activist government in terms of the decline of trust in government.201  
He uses the NES and other data to show that “declining political trust 
has played the central role in the demise of progressive public policy 
in the United States over the last several decades.”202  Hetherington 
discounts the role of ideological change, contending little evidence 
exists that there has been a conservative turn in public opinion.203  
When Americans actually benefit from government programs, they 
support them.204  But people need to trust the national government in 
order for that government to undertake the sort of programs that 
benefit minorities by using taxes and benefits drawn from majorities, 
such as antipoverty and race-targeted programs.205  Hetherington 
comments, “While the early to middle 1960s were perhaps anomalous 
in their high levels of public trust, they allowed policymakers great 
leeway in proposing and implementing federal solutions to America’s 
problems.”206 
A proactive government able to address policy problems as they 
arise must be underwritten by the authority granted by public trust in 
government.  This trust might be thought of as a willingness to grant 
the benefit of the doubt.  Roughly since the mid-1970s, the American 
public has been unwilling to grant that benefit, thus placing a sort of 
invisible limit on the ability of government to act. 
Why would a renewed emphasis on domestic issues result in a 
permanent decline in trust?  Here we should turn to two pathbreak-
ing studies on the “process preferences” of Americans done by John 
Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse.207  Their approach is unusual 
and valuable in that they focus on how Americans want public busi-
ness done, rather than asking about their policy preferences.  This 
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means their studies provide insight into the constitutional prefer-
ences of Americans concerning how politics should be structured.208 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse contend that “people’s support for the 
political system is influenced at least as much by the processes em-
ployed in the political system as by the particular outputs emanating 
from the process.  Policy is important, but the public’s perceptions of 
how that policy was arrived at also matters.”209  This means that it is 
possible for trust in government to be influenced by how government 
operates.  Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s results suggest that trust is low 
because Americans do not like the normal processes of democratic 
government.  As they put it: 
Americans tend to dislike virtually all . . . democratic processes . . . . They 
dislike compromise and bargaining, they dislike committees and bu-
reaucracy, they dislike political parties and interest groups, they dislike 
big salaries and big staffs, they dislike slowness and multiple stages, and 
they dislike debate and publicly hashing things out, referring to such ac-
tions as haggling or bickering.210 
In short, Americans do not like political conflict.  Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse’s first study was of Congress, often thought of as the 
most democratic, representative, and responsive branch of govern-
ment.  But the study participants did not see it that way.  It is well 
known that Americans tend to have negative views of Congress in 
general even as they have positive views of their own representative.211  
Care must be taken in interpreting this result.  Americans may in fact 
have a positive view of “Congress,” the constitutional institution.  But 
crucially, they have a poor opinion of members of Congress when 
they act collectively.212  Among the three constitutional institutions, 
Congress is the least approved.213 
Where does Congress go wrong?  Hibbing and Theiss-Morse’s re-
sults show that Americans believe that members of Congress have 
been corrupted by special interests.214  Americans tend not to identify 
with special interests, whether of the left or right.  Instead, they see 
interest groups as the favored clients of the Washington “insider” sys-
 
208 In employing their results, my assumption is that it is plausible that their results, obtained 
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tem of politics.215  The public hates the very idea of insiders.  “It re-
minds them of their own outsider status and it opens the possibility 
that benefits will be distributed in something other than a just and 
equitable fashion.”216  From the perspective of constitutional history, 
there is a tinge of Jacksonian political values here.  It is also appropri-
ate to note an echo of the themes present in late nineteenth century 
California politics. 
The broader picture is that Congress is the most detested branch 
because it is the most visible branch.217  But what is visible is the stan-
dard legislative politics of conflict and debate, followed by compro-
mise and logrolling.  The public loathes each and every element of 
this normal democratic process.218  People who have more political 
knowledge are more likely to be tolerant of debate and compromise.  
But even Americans who are relatively expert about politics detest po-
litical professionalization and interest groups.219  Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse conclude that “[a] surprising number of people, it seems, dis-
like being exposed to processes endemic to democratic govern-
ment.”220  Americans appear to be convinced “that we can have a de-
mocracy without uncertainty, conflicting options, confusion, 
bargaining, or compromises for solutions.”221 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse followed up their study of Congress 
with a study of American attitudes toward government in general.222  
They contend Americans want “stealth democracy,” an efficient de-
mocracy that does not require their active participation.223  Their 
study shows that while people do not generally want to be active in 
government, they do want it to be available, accountable, and open 
when they do wish to become involved.224  However, normally what 
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people want from government is consensus, unity of purpose, and a 
lack of concern for special interests, not accountability and respon-
siveness.225  “The processes people really want would not be provided 
by the populist reform agenda they often embrace; it would be pro-
vided by a stealth democratic arrangement in which decisions are 
made by neutral decision makers who do not require sustained input 
from the people in order to function.”226 
With respect to trust in government, Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 
propose that it is driven more by perceptions of process than by pol-
icy outcomes.  After all, studies have shown that voters are usually in-
terested in just a few issues and people do not have a well-developed 
set of policy preferences.227  Further, policy outcomes do not seem to 
explain variances in trust in government.228  In the 1990s, for exam-
ple, “victory in the Cold War and the incredibly strong economy from 
late 1992 to mid-1997 brought some of the worst marks for dissatisfac-
tion with government since the beginning of systematic public opin-
ion data.”229 
Nearly 70% of the respondents in the 1998 Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse survey felt that the political system was not responsive to their 
interests.230  This was despite the fact that most Americans perceive 
government policies to be moderate, in line with their own prefer-
ences.231  Nonetheless, “[m]any people who have no particular prob-
lem with the policies produced by the government are tremendously 
dissatisfied with that government.”232  Dissatisfaction with government 
is thus not based on policy disputes, but rather on how the process of 
government works. 
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse argue that the low opinion Americans 
have of democratic processes is driven by the misperception that 
their policy interests and preferences are similar to the majority of 
Americans.  The public believes there is a consensus on public policy, 
but a flawed process in Washington is frustrating the true interests of 
the people.233  People believe that “special interests and their cronies 
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in the political parties and in government have commandeered the 
entire process.”234 
More positively, what Americans want from the political process is 
to have decisions made unselfishly, without influence from special in-
terests.235  The American people want policymaking elites to be disin-
terested and not self-serving.236  So if it were possible to have govern-
ment “by non-self-interested elites,”237 Americans would readily accept 
this alternative. 
In light of these process preferences, it will not be surprising to 
legal scholars that in the 1998 survey done by Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse, the Supreme Court was the most popular institution of gov-
ernment.238  Americans are well disposed toward government institu-
tions as a whole, but they tend to dislike Congress and the federal 
government the most, the Supreme Court and state governments the 
least.239  True, Americans do not want major changes in our system of 
government, but they define “major” in a different way from political 
elites.  “Major” would be throwing democracy overboard for authori-
tarian government.  On this conception, the banning of all interest 
groups would not count as a major change and many Americans find 
the idea of such a ban attractive.240 
The general picture that emerges from the Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse studies is of an American public that wants government by 
consensus and dislikes political conflict of any kind.  Hibbing and 
Theiss-Morse contend that Americans falsely believe that there is a 
consensus on the policy goals the country should have and the means 
to achieve them.241  “Consequently, when it is apparent that the politi-
cal arena is filled with intense policy disagreement, people conclude 
that the reason must be illegitimate—namely, the influence of special 
interests.”242  The belief in a false consensus must be stated carefully, 
however.243  Hibbing and Theiss-Morse note that “[t]he false consen-
sus that really hurts people’s views of the government is not the one 
that leads people to believe that everyone shares their policy belief 
 
234 Id. at 38. 
235 Id. at 85–86. 
236 Id. at 86. 
237 Id. at 130. 
238 Id. at 100. 
239 Id. at 101. 
240 Id. at 103. 
241 Id. at 132–33. 
242 Id. at 133. 
243 Id. at 133–34. 
 
Feb. 2009] CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTIONALISM 587 
 
but the one that says everyone shares their lack of concern about 
most of the issues the government is addressing.”244  That is, from the 
perspective of the average citizen, national politics is full of intense 
and apparently endless conflict over issues that are unimportant.245  
No wonder citizens are frustrated with government. 
Americans thus dislike debate, compromise, and conflict.246  “In 
fact, people believe the very existence of conflict is a sign that elected 
officials are out of touch with ordinary Americans.”247  Large percent-
ages of the public would view favorably governing structures that are 
not democratic, such as leaving decisions to nonelected experts.248  
Hibbing and Theiss-Morse call this method of government “stealth 
democracy.”249  “The goal in stealth democracy is for decisions to be 
made efficiently, objectively, and without commotion and disagree-
ment.”250 
The studies by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse raise many interesting 
and important questions about American democracy and have clear 
implications for the debate over direct democracy.  In terms of the 
discussion in this part of the Article, I am concerned only with the 
implications of their findings for the two aspects of the decline of 
trust in government identified earlier:  Why did trust begin declining 
before the traumas of Vietnam and Watergate, and why was the de-
cline permanent in the sense of never fully regaining the ground 
lost? 
These studies suggest that trust declined because American poli-
tics moved from a regime that was relatively consensual to one that 
was riven by conflict.  It is not news that the 1950s was a time of con-
sensus in American politics.  Certainly American intellectuals thought 
so at the time.  But historians have also reached this judgment in 
hindsight.251  The sense of consensus had several sources.  One was 
President Eisenhower’s acceptance of the basic structure of the New 
Deal, including social security.252  Another was Eisenhower’s style of 
leadership, “evok[ing] a quiescent mood of stability and consen-
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sus.”253  Certainly politicians did not hear many complaints about the 
economy, which was undergoing a period of tremendous growth.254  If 
the 1950s “gave Americans a sense of pride in themselves and confi-
dence in the future,”255 historians have also noted a change in the na-
tional mood at the end of the Eisenhower administration and extend-
ing into the early 1960s, one that possibly heralded a new period of 
activist government.256  It seems Americans were undergoing a period 
of transition, but the shape of the new politics was unclear. 
It is worth noting that in substantial measure, the political consen-
sus of the 1950s was artificial.  The normal channels of political dis-
sent and protest were smothered by the fear of communism and the 
politics that fed from this fear, usually called McCarthyism.257  As “the 
most widespread and longest lasting wave of political repression in 
American history,”258 McCarthyism had a significant effect on Ameri-
can politics.  Any viewpoint that was to the left of the Democratic 
party was suspect.  Hence, the range of political debate was nar-
rowed.259  Americans living through this period might have justifiably 
acquired the idea, expressed somewhat later by President Kennedy, 
that politics was simply a matter of administration, not of fundamen-
tal ideological conflict. 
To understand this transition within a constitutional framework, 
we need to recall the background in which it occurred.  The reigning 
constitutional order was that of the New Deal.  The national govern-
ment’s assumption of responsibility for regulating the economy dur-
ing the New Deal had profound implications for American constitu-
tionalism.  The activism of the government in addressing the Great 
Depression encouraged citizens to look routinely to national politics 
for solutions to social problems.260  Once the constitutional barriers to 
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the expansion of the national political agenda were removed, there 
were no limits on the kind of issues the national state might consider. 
Thus, to widen the focus somewhat, the 1960–66 period was a key 
moment of transition within the New Deal constitutional order.  
There was a growing sense that the boundaries of political change 
had been drawn too tightly.  McCarthyism and the loyalty security 
programs that went with it had ebbed.  The perceived external threat 
from the Soviet Union lessened after 1963.  Americans were ready for 
more consensual progress, but instead they encountered a conten-
tious national politics.261  In the midst of the transition to a politics of 
conflict and polarization, Americans began reacting negatively by in-
dicating a lack of trust in government.  As political conflict continued 
and intensified in the late 1960s, Americans responded by driving 
levels of distrust to new lows.  The era of permanently low trust in 
government had arrived. 
In many respects, however, citizens retained a political worldview 
characteristic of an earlier constitutional regime.  Perhaps there were 
some resemblances between what Americans expected from politics 
in the 1950s and what they expected in the 1790s.  But it is more 
likely that the Jacksonian era, with its emphasis on political equality, 
combating privilege, and hostility to the “interests,” is the nearest an-
cestor of the kind of worldview described in the Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse studies.  This mismatch between political worldview and the 
interest group state established in the New Deal could persist because 
of the political consensus behind President Roosevelt’s efforts to fight 
the Great Depression and win World War II.  Once that consensus 
eroded, Americans began to glimpse the real nature of politics in a 
state full of interest groups jostling for advantage, lobbyists seeking 
influence, polarized single issue organizations, and politicians bro-
kering deals among them all. 
The turmoil in American politics after the 1950s suggests that 
there is no such thing as a democratic politics of consensus as a nor-
mal state of affairs.  Thus, when a consensus exists on a wide range of 
policy issues in a democracy, it is reasonable to infer that it is being 
maintained by an unusual external threat (such as during a war), or 
is the result of a constricted political agenda produced by economic, 
social, or legal restrictions on political participation.  The Cold War 
produced a bipartisan consensus in foreign affairs because an exter-
nal threat was perceived clearly by elites and the public.  It also had 
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an important effect in limiting the further extension of the New Deal 
domestic policy agenda, as unions and other liberal organizations 
were forced on the defensive during the era of McCarthyism.262  In 
addition, the restrictions on the electorate enacted in the Populist-
Progressive eras remained in force.263  All of these factors maintained 
the World War II consensus long after the fighting had ended. 
Consider, then, how many roads intersected in the 1960s.  The le-
gal restrictions on effective political participation were for the most 
part abolished.  There was renewed attention to domestic issues in 
the context of long-standing grievances by minorities.  Consensus dis-
appeared and polarization increased.  To put it another way, the 
United States experienced full-fledged national democratic politics 
for the first time in its history.  Americans responded to the political 
effects of this tremendous historical achievement with something like 
disgust.  Not that Americans are opposed to democracy, the right to 
vote, or the principles of the civil rights movement.  But the Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse studies show that Americans do not understand 
that making politics more democratic does not make it more consen-
sual.  In fact, the opposite is the case. 
III.  COMING TO TERMS WITH DIRECT DEMOCRACY 
In this final Part, I will discuss direct democracy and “California 
constitutionalism” in light of the decline of trust in government.  I 
hope it is apparent that instead of regarding direct democracy as de-
viant, it might be more appropriate to ask why it does not exist on a 
national level.  The answer probably lies with the greater difficulty in 
amending the federal Constitution.  Nevertheless, the problems with 
representative government in California are national problems.  Citi-
zens do not have much respect for the legislative process and seek al-
ternatives if they have the chance.  For reasons of history at least dis-
tantly related to the problems citizens have with contemporary 
politics, Californians have been afforded a chance denied to citizens 
nationwide. 
Again, this is not to deny that direct democracy has serious short-
comings.  Before briefly setting forth a number of the more signifi-
cant criticisms, I hope it is evident why I will not devote attention to 
the familiar charge that direct democracy is inconsistent with the 
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Founders’ vision of republican government.264  This sort of sweeping 
criticism ignores the reality that we have allowed extensive formal 
constitutional change at the state level to supplement the original de-
signs of the Founding Generation.  It also ignores that the latter-day 
framers of direct democracy had good reason to conclude that repre-
sentative government had fallen short and required reform. 
As the twentieth century gave way to the twenty-first, it was evident 
there were at least three substantial lines of critique against the use of 
direct democracy, particularly in the initiative, in California politics.  
First, critics argued that rather than create a better form of popular 
politics, the initiative had become simply another venue for interest 
groups to pursue their goals.265  Interest groups, not voters, seemed to 
dominate initiative politics.  Second, there were persistent worries 
that initiatives tend to work against the interests of minorities, par-
ticularly racial and ethnic minorities.266  Divisive and often bitterly 
contested initiatives relating to English as an official language 
(Proposition 63), abolishing affirmative action (Proposition 209),267 
restricting illegal immigration and its effects (Proposition 187), and 
abolishing bilingual education (Proposition 227) lent credence to 
this idea.268  Third, critics charged that the initiative led to a defective, 
indeed self-defeating, system of governance.269 
While it is not my purpose to defend direct democracy against 
these generally sound criticisms, it is worth noting that critics have 
had a hard time identifying flaws of direct democracy that are truly 
unique in the sense that they identify a clear difference between it 
and representative government.  After all, undue influence by inter-
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est groups is a problem that plagues all legislatures in the United 
States.  In addition, as John Matsusaka points out, “the fact that nar-
row interests dominate the initiative process . . . does not necessarily 
imply that the final outcomes are nonmajoritarian.”270  Voters are free 
to reject initiatives sponsored by interest groups and have done so.271  
They do not often have that chance with respect to legislative meas-
ures sponsored by the same groups.  Careful historical investigation 
has revealed that interest group involvement with initiatives is noth-
ing new and has been present almost from the beginning.272 
With respect to minority interests, while I do not wish in any way 
to minimize the real concerns behind this criticism, I note that as a 
general matter, it would be difficult to show that direct democracy 
has a record worse than the ample examples of violations of rights by 
elected officials.  For example, Jim Crow laws segregating African 
Americans were passed by state legislatures.273  There is some evi-
dence that minority voters in California support the institutions of di-
rect democracy.274 
In response to these and other criticisms, there is no shortage of 
proposals for reform of direct democracy, especially the initiative.275  
Whatever the right mix of reforms of direct democracy and the legis-
lative process, I hope I have shown that they must be considered to-
gether.  What is probably required is not tinkering, but major consti-
tutional reform. 
On the other side, how might legislatures be reformed?  The sur-
vey research on Congress reviewed in Part II suggests in general that 
legislators must come to grips with the reality that they are always on 
trial as far as ordinary citizens are concerned.276  Political scientists 
David Brady and Sean Theriault have argued that the public has little 
tolerance for rules that allow legislators to escape accountability for 
taking positions on difficult issues or the consistent use of hyperbolic 
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and meaningless rhetoric in legislative debates.277  In addition, the 
common practice of running for Congress by bashing the institution 
can only have negative consequences for trust.278  Finally, the media 
tends to magnify the role of the most extreme (and least effective) 
members of Congress.279  The public absorbs what it is being told, but 
the picture that develops is not one that helps support the institution. 
The conclusions reached by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse in their 
study of the public’s preference for “stealth democracy” are more 
counterintuitive.280  They suggest the legislative process should be less 
transparent, as in less televised and subject to sunshine laws.281  Ap-
parently more transparency leads to greater distrust.  They argue on 
the basis of their survey that people prefer rule by the people them-
selves (direct democracy) or non-self-interested nonelected elites 
(such as the Supreme Court and Federal Reserve Board) to rule by 
legislators.282  To change the public’s overwhelmingly negative opin-
ion of legislators, their contacts with and possible benefits from spe-
cial interest groups must be reduced to a minimum or eliminated 
(notwithstanding the First Amendment!).283  Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse advance what might be termed an “anti-participation” perspec-
tive on democracy:  “While people are not eager to provide input into 
political decisions, they want to know that they could have input into 
political decisions if they ever wanted to do so.  In fact, they are pas-
sionate about this.”284 
I have largely bypassed the debate between critics and proponents 
of direct democracy in this Article because I believe both sides are 
evading a major issue.  Direct democracy would not exist had there 
not been a serious and unanswered problem with representative gov-
ernment.  And it could not have persisted or, indeed, grown in 
strength had there not been background conditions, such as declin-
ing trust in government coupled with legislative inaction, that let it 
flourish.  Although critics of direct democracy make occasional ges-
tures toward the flaws of contemporary politics, the depth of genuine 
popular dissatisfaction with legislatures is rarely acknowledged or 
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made a subject of sustained analysis.  The key problem of trust in 
government remains largely unexplored in the literature about direct 
democracy. 
There is no road to fundamental reform or abolition of direct 
democracy without addressing the flaws and equally problematic re-
cord of representative government.  When we critique direct democ-
racy, we must also acknowledge and critique the flaws of government 
by legislature.  In many ways, they are two aspects of the same prob-
lem—the lack of trust in government.  This will continue to be a ma-
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IS Ends bilingual education286 61–39% 
 
ICA = Initiative Constitutional Amendment; IS = Initiative Statute 
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